The United States, South Africa and Africa: Of Grand Foreign Policy Aims and Modest Means by Brian J. Hesse

Author:Brian J. Hesse [Hesse, Brian J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781138723887
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2019-11-11T00:00:00+00:00

Chapter Six:

Coming to Terms With Self and Situation

When the United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher called in on President Mandela in October 1996, South African foreign policy makers had already experienced a roller-coaster ride of a year. Among the highs had been South Africa's hosting of the ninth meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, President Mandela's assumption of the Chairmanship of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and his triumphant state visits to Britain, France, and Germany. As for the lows, some of these had included: Mandela's failed attempt to rally international support for sanctions against Nigeria, in response to the Abacha regime's execution of Nigerian human rights activists (which, incidentally, led to questions as to why South Africa had issued low-profile responses to other obvious human rights violators, like Indonesia); bitter trade negotiations with the European Union; a divisive row in the government surrounding South Africa's 'two Chinas' policy; and an inability to mount a clear response to crises in Africa's Great Lakes area. In other words, the mix was indicative that South Africa was increasingly becoming 'just another country'.1

The fact that South Africa was becoming 'just another country' in 1996 in many ways was nothing more than a product of time's passing. Assuming the adage 'a day in politics is like a year' is true, the reality was that two full years had elapsed since the South African elections of April-May 1994. Consequently, the international community's recollection of events — even given the level of euphoria at the time — had begun to fade. With this dulling of the collective memory had come a corresponding change in how South Africa was perceived. For many countries, South Africa was becoming more and more like so many others.

However, as of late 1996 key South African foreign policy makers had not yet realised the extent to which international perceptions had, and were, shifting. For them, the events of April-May 1994 were as if they had happened yesterday — not at all surprising given the length of their struggle and the sacrifices made to end apartheid. From this arose sentiments that, on one hand, Mandela's 'international moral authority' should and could be enough in its own right to shift the diplomatic playing field in South Africa's favour,2 and on the other, that having successfully pulled off 'The South African Miracle', South Africa deserved a larger degree of latitude than most other countries for a longer period. Put another way, reputation — whether personal or national, real or perceived — had become a major factor in South African foreign policy. This was causing an ever-widening gap between what the international community thought of South Africa and what South African foreign policy makers themselves thought of South Africa. As a result, in late 1996 many of the latter were convinced that they could still use reputation to avoid having to make certain difficult choices, or to shield them from the negative effects of choices made.3 This, of course, had implications.

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